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COMPENSABLE WORKING TIME UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT*
CHARLES H. LIVENGOOD, JR.
Practical application of the Fair Labor Standards Act' immediately
raises the basic question of what time constitutes hours of employment,
for which payment must be made in compliance with the minimum-wage
and overtime requirements. The original statute did not define com-
pensable time, although Section 3(g) states broadly that to employ
"includes to suffer or permit to Work." Much controversy developed
when employees began to claim compensation for activities preliminary
or postliminary to their principal duties, such as changing clothes, wash-
ing up, or traveling to and from "their usual workplace.
A. What Are Hours of Employment?
Some wide judicial definitions of "hours worked" created unexpected
liabilities on the part of employers. In decisions of 1944 and 1945, the
Supreme Court held that time spent by iron-ore and coal miners in going
from the mine portal to the working face and returning to the portal
was time for which pay was due under the Act, notwithstanding the
fact that neither contract nor custom recognized such time as com-
pensable.2 Work, said the Court, includes "physical or mental exertion
(whether burdensome or not), controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer
and his business." The next year, this principle was extended to a
manufacturing plant in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.3 There
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129 U. S. C. §§201-219 (1938) ; Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, P. L. 718, 75th
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who is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the production of goods
therefor, shall be paid a minimum wage equivalent to 75¢ per hour and shall re-
ceive compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week at a rate not less
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the Supreme Court held that the minimum time necessarily spent in
walking between the time-clock and the employee's regular workplace,
as well as in various make-ready activities (such as putting on overalls,
taping or greasing arms, preparing equipment, turning switches, laying
out tools, and opening windows) must be included in the compensable
workweek.
These decisions provoked a flood of law-suits demanding "portal to
portal" pay, and these in turn led to enactment of the Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947.4 To a large extent, determination of time worked is now
governed by Section 4 of the latter statute, supplemented by Section
3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended in 1949. However,
many of the older working time tests developed by the Wage-Hour
Administrator and the courts remain controlling. Neither the Portal-
to-Portal Act nor the 1949 Amendments affect the compensability of
employees' time during their regular working hours; in defining work-
ing time, both relate solely to incidental activities before or after the
regular workday. 5
B. "Principal" vs. "Fringe" Activities
In brief, Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes from the
concept of "hours worked" those functions "preliminary" or "postlim-
inary" to the employee's "principal" duties, unless such functions are
compensable by contract, custom or practice. This necessitates a dis-
tinction between principal and fringe activities, for neither the presence
nor the absence of a contract, custom or practice can affect the com-
pensable status under the Fair Labor Standards Act of the employee's
principal activities, although established compensation practices may help
to determine what is a "principal" activity.
1. Principal Activities.
One of the federal courts has said that the phrase "principal activity
or activities" used in Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act clearly refers
to the productive work which is the object of the employment. 6 The
Administrator, relying upon the legislative history as well as the lan-
guage of the statute, seems to go somewhat further. He notes in his
Interpretative Bulletin that use of the plural "activities" indicates that
an activity need not be predominant in order to be "principal," and that
an employee may be engaged in several "principal" activities during the
workday. He defines "principal activities" to include those activities
which the employee is "employed to perform," "any work of conse-
quence" no matter when performed, "such activities as are indispensable
'61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§251-263 (Supp. III, 1950).
'29 CoDE FED. REGS. §790.6 (1947). Sec. 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act limits
the concept of working time even within the regular workday, but that section ap-
plies only to activities performed prior to May 14, 1947.
'McComb v. Swanson & Sons, 77 F. Supp. 716 (D. Neb. 1948).
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to the performance of productive work," and "all activities which are
an integral part of a principal activity."7
The Administrator offers several examples, based upon Congres-
sional comments on the Portal Bill, to illustrate what is "indispensable
to" or "an integral part of" an employee's principal activities. Thus, if
an operator frequently cleans or greases his machine at the beginning of
the workday, or if an employee is required to report early to lay out
work for other employees and prepare equipment, these make-ready
operations are among the principal activities of the employee and must
be counted and paid for in accordance with the minimum-wage and
overtime standards, regardless of contrary custom or contract. Simi-
larly, changing clothes on the employer's prerhiises at the beginning and
end of the workday is an integral part of principal activity when required
by the nature of the work, by the employer's rules, or by law. But if
clothes-changing is merely a convenience to the employee, it will be
considered a preliminary or postliminary rather than a principal activity.
The 1949 Amendments added a new rule with respect to clothes-
changing and washing-up at the start and finish of the employee's work-
day. Under Section 3 (o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended,
time so spent need not be counted as hours worked if "excluded from
measured working time during the week involved by the express terms
of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective bargaining
agreement applicable to the particular employee." This provision was
apparently intended to permit union contracts to change the working-
time status of clothes-changing and washing-up when they would other-
wise be compensable because necessitated by statute, plant rules, or the
nature of the job.
2. Preliminary and Postliminary Activities.
In the absence of a contract, custom or practice to the contrary, as
described hereafter, Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act provides that
preliminary and postliminary activities need not be counted as time
worked. Such activities do not include any which occur after the em-
ployee begins his first principal activity on a given workday and before
he ends his last principal activity on that day. In other words, the
Portal-to-Portal Act 'does not affect computation of hours worked within
the workday proper-roughly the period from whistle to whistle. Time
spent by the employee during that period must be counted and paid for
in accordance with rules developed by the courts. In general, as indi-
129 CODE FED. REGs. §790.8 (1947). In Culkin v. Glenn L. Martin Nebraska
Co., 10 WH Cas. (BNA) 225 (D. Neb. 1951) the court held that guards and fire-
men who remained at their regular posts during their lunch periods were engaged
in their "principal activities" within the meaning of the Portal Act, and were there-
fore entitled to have such periods counted as hours worked irrespective of contract,
custom or practice. Accord: Biggs v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 183 F. 2d 515 (C. C. A.
9th, 1950).
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cated above, time spent by the employee during the ordinary workday
must be paid for if it involves physical or mental exertion which is con-
trolled or required by the employer, and which is for the employer's
benefit.
As noted in the Wage-Hour Administrator's relevant Interpretative
Bulletin, no comprehensive listing of preliminary and postliminary ac-
tivities is possible. What is a fringe activity in one situation may be
an integral part of the employee's principal activities in another. How-
ever, the Portal Act itself mentions as preliminary or postliminary
activities of an employee "walking, riding, or traveling to and from the
actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which
such employee is employed to perform," prior or subsequent to the
workday. The Administrator warns that the travel so described in
Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act is the ordinary daily travel between
home and workplace. He does not consider travel between workplaces,
or during regular working hours, or outside such hours at the direction
and on the business of the employer, to be the kind of "walking, riding,
or traveling" referred to in Section 4. On the other 'hand, he cites as
examples of preliminary or postliminary activities (a) walking from
plant gate to workbench, (b) riding from camp to logging site, (c)
-washing up and changing clothes when for the employee's own con-
venience and not directly related to his job, (d) waiting in line for pay
checks, (e) checking in and out of the plant and waiting to do so, and
(f) waiting for work after early arrival not required or expected. 8
3. Effect of Contract, Custom or Practice.
Even though activities are preliminary or postliminary, it may be
necessary to count them as time worked under the Fair Labor Standards
'Act if they are "compensable" by an applicable contract, custom or
practice. Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act uses the word "com-
pensable" without qualification and presumably means compensable in
any amount.
If an action for restitution is based upon non-payment of minimum
wages or overtime compensation through failure to count time spent in
preliminary or postliminary activities, the plaintiff should affirmatively
plead the contract or custom or practice upon which he is relying, and
be prepared to carry the burden of proof on that issue.9
829 CODE FED. REGS. §790.7 (1947).9 Bumpus v. Remington Arms Co., 183 F. 2d 507 (C. C. A. 8th, 1950) ; Bonner
v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F. 2d 703 (C. C. A. 2d, 1949) ; U. S. Cartridge Co.
v. Powell, 185 F. 2d 67 (C. C. A. 8th, 1950), s. c. 186 F. 2d 611 (C. C. A. 8th.
1951), cert. denied, 10 WH Cas. (BNA) 225 (USSC, 1951). But cf. Central Mis-
souri Telephone Co. v. Conwell, 170 F. 2d 641 (C. C. A. 8th, 1948). It should be
noted that most of the reported cases were decided under section 2 of the Portal
Act, and that section applies only to activities performed prior to May 14, 1947.
Somewhat different results may be reached under section 4, covering activities since
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If a contract is relied upon to support a back-pay claim for fringe
activities, it may be either written or oral. But it must "by an express
provision" show that payment was intended for the particular activity.
Moreover, the contract must have been in effect at the establishment or
other place of employment when the activity was performed.' 0 It must
be a contract between the employer and the employee affected, or his
agent or collective bargaining representative. A contract between the
employer and a government agency, for example, will not suffice.."
When there is no express contract requiring payment for a specific
fringe activity, the employee may still be entitled to have it counted as
working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act if he can establish a
custom or practice by which the employer has paid employees for this
activity. Such a custom or practice must exist at the particular place of
employment-merely showing a custom or practice in the industry is
not enough.12 The custom or practice must not be inconsistent with a
pertinent contract, and it must have been in effect as to the particular
form of activity when the employee engaged in it. Moreover, a custom
or practice of paying for an activity when carried on during one portion
of the day will not sustain a claim based upon the same activity during
a wholly different part of the day.' 8
4. The De Minimis Doctrine and Proof of Tine Worked.
In the Mt. Clemens case,14 the Supreme Court held that the maxim
de minimis non curat lex applies to preliminary and postliminary activi-
ties. On remand of the case, the district court concluded that two or
three minutes of walking or make-ready work should be disregarded as
de minimis, but that as much as twelve minutes of walking should not
be.15 Apparently the de minimis doctrine is not affected by the Portal-
to-Portal Act. Thus, in Frank v. Wilson & Co.,16 the doctrine was held
to make five minutes of pre-shift work noncompensable.
In the Mt. Clemens case, the Supreme Court also ruled that the
employee will have carried his burden of proof as to time worked "if
that date, because its application is limited to preliminary and postliminary activities
and because it contains no jurisdictional clause comparable to subsection (d) of
section 2. Cf. Welsh v. W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., 91 F. Supp. 685 (W. D. Pa.1950); Coyle v. Philadelphia Macaroni Co., 9 F. R. D. 331 (E. D. Pa. 1949).10 Joshua Hendy Corp. v. Mills, 169 F. 2d 898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1948); In reKellett Aircraft Corp., 85 F. Supp. 525 (E. D. Pa. 1949); 29 CoDE FED. REGs.§790.9 (1947).
" Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F. 2d 266 (C. C. A. 6th, 1948), cert.denied, 335 U. S. 902 (1949).
12 Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F. 2d 703 (C. C. A. 2d, 1949).
" 29 CoDE FED. REGs. §§790.10-790.12 (1947).14 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680 (1946).
1069 F. Supp. 710 (E. D. Mich. 1947), appeal dismissed;162F. 2d 200 (C. C. A.-
6th, 1947).
10 172 F. 2d 712 (C. C. A. 7th, 1949), cert. denied, 337 U. S. 918 (1949). See
,Iqo Tully v. Joshua Hendy. Corp., 79-F.-Supp. 709(S. D. Calif. 1948).
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he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was im-
properly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the
amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable
inference." The Court based this ruling upon the proposition that it
is the duty of the employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act to
keep proper records, and his breach of this duty should not be allowed
to defeat the claim of an employee who cannot prove with precision the
exact hours worked. The Court also noted that in such cases as this
the time-clock records could not be used to calculate working time, since
they did not accurately reflect it. Nothing in the Portal-to-Portal Act
or the 1949 Amendments appears to change these rules as to form of
evidence and certainty of proof.
C. Some Specific Problems
The 1949 Amendments as well as the Portal-to-Poral Act fail to
provide any definition of "hours' worked" with respect to (a) nonpro-
ductive time spent by the employee during the regular workday, and
(b) activities outside the regular workday which are an integral part
of (rather than just preliminary or postliminary to) the employee's
principal activities. This poses questions for which answers must be
sought in past and future interpretations by the Wage-Hour Adminis-
trator and the courts. A few of the most common problems are here
described.
It is quite possible, of course, that at least some of the courts may
construe the Portal-to-Portal Act more loosely than the Administrator.
In that event, some of the earlier opinions referred to below may not be
followed. However, it must be borne in mind that judges have gen-
erally accorded substantial weight to interpretations by the official with
day-to-day experience in practical administration of the statute.17
1. Waiting Time and Interruptions of Work.
It has been the Administrator's position that periods of inactivity
during the workday are time worked if caused by interruptions beyond
the employee's control and if he must stand by because work may at
any time be resumed.1 8 The result may be the same even when the
employer tells him he is free to leave the premises, if the interval is too
short to be used effectively for his own interests. Typical situations
involve machinery breakdowns, power failures, and delay of materials.
Similarly, if the nature of the employee's job involves idle time while
on duty-as is often the case with drivers, messengers, guards, sales-
" See U. S. v. American Trucking Assn's., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 549 (1940);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); Mabee v. White Plains Pub-
lishing Co., 327 U. S. 178, 182 (1946).18W-H Div. Interp. Bull. No. 13, §§4-8 (1940); cf. Cameron v. Bendix Avia-
tion Corp., 65 F. Supp. 510 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
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clerks and the like-the idle time must ordinarily be counted. In other
words, if he is employed to wait, and not merely waiting to be employed,
his working hours normally extend from the time he is required to be
in readiness until he is relieved of all responsibility. 19 However, idle
time on duty in some occupations need not be counted, depending upon
(a) the extent to which the employee is free for personal affairs and
(b) the frequency with which he must perform active work. Thus the
night operator of a small telephone exchange, who has the switchboard
installed in her own home and who has very few calls, is not entitled to
have sleeping time counted as hours worked; but if the employee has
little consecutive time for normal sleep, the result may be opposite. 2°
2. Time Spent on Call.
Time on call after hours need not be counted merely because the
employee is required to leave word where he can be reached in emer-
gency. But if he is required to stand by at the employer's place of busi-
ness it may be necessary to count time so spent-at least if his availability
is found to be a "principal activity" so as not to be within the contract-
or-custom requirement of the Portal-to-Portal Act. In cases decided
prior to that statute, the Supreme Court ruled that the time spent by
employees serving as fire guards on company premises several nights
a week should be counted, except for time spent eating and sleeping,
even though (a) the parties had agreed otherwise, (b) active work was
less than half an hour per week, and (c) recreational facilities were
available and used.21
Troublesome questions have arisen as to jobs which require the
employee to be on call 24 hours a day. In some cases, as where a pump-
tender must remain near an oil well with substantial and frequent duties,
it may be necessary to count all hours.22 But, in a pre-Portal-Act bul-
letin, the Administrator said he would accept a "reasonable" computa-
tion of working time, when an inference that the employee is not work-
ing for all 24 hours is justifiable. 23 And two courts of appeal agreed
that firemen on 24-hour duty at the plant were not "working" during
8-hour sleeping shifts except while responding to infrequent emergency
calls. 24
"Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 (1944).2 Compare Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co., 51 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1943), with Bicanic v. J. C. Campbell Co., 220 Minn. 107, 19 N. W. 2d 7 (1945),
cert. denied, 327 U. S. 787 (1946).
"
1 Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 (1944) ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U. S. 134 (1944). See also Dumas v. King, 157 F. 2d 463 (C. C. A. 8th,
1946); Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. 2d 90 (C. C. A. 5th 1941).2 Fleming v. Rex Oil & Gas Co., 43 F. Supp. 950 (W. D. Mich. 1941).
"W-H Div. Interp. Bull. No. 13, §7 (1940).
2 Bell v. Porter, 159 F. 2d 117 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 813
(1947); Rokey v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 157 F. 2d 734 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946).
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3. Recesses and Meal Periods.
Ordinarily, regular meal periods in which the employee is relieved
of all responsibility need not be counted as working hours, even if he
must remain on the premises. However, if the employer's practice is
to pay for meal periods, this may be some evidence that they are time
worked.25 In any event, the meal period or other recess must be
counted if the employee cannot effectively use the time in his own in-
terest, either because the period is too short or because of continuing
responsibility or frequent interruptions for duty.2 6
As to both meal periods and rest periods, the Administrator has
adopted the rule of thumb that anything less than 20 minutes is too
brief for true personal use and is time worked. Whether longer rest
periods are working time depends upon circumstances, such as the fact
that the employee can use the period for something more than improv-
ing his productive efficiency.2 7
4. Meetings, Grievance Time and Training Programs.
If meetings, lectures, fire drills, safety programs, instruction courses
and the like are held outside normal working hours, the custom-or-
contract requirements of the Portal Act may govern. But if meetings or
programs are conducted during the regular workday, exclusion of such
time from hours worked would apparently require at least (a) that
attendance be purely voluntary, (b) that the employee produce no goods
during the period, and (c) that the meeting not be for the purpose of
improving the employee's skill or similarly related directly to his job.2 8
It has been the Division's policy that time properly spent by em-
ployees in grievance conferences during the workday should be recog-
nized as working time, since it furthers the employer's interest in har-
monious industrial relations, but that time voluntarily so spent after
normal hours may be ignored unless there is an understanding that the
time is compensable. 29
Liabilities may arise from failure to perceive that health programs,
required physical examinations, and treatment for job injuries all may
tend to benefit the employer and may therefore constitute hours worked
-at least when the time consumed involves part of the ordinary work-
day.30
-'29 CODE FED. REGs.'§778.17 (1950).
-o Biggs v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 183 F. 2d 515 (C. C. A. 9th, 1950) ; Culkin v.
Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co., 10 WH Cas. (BNA) 225 (D. Neb. 1951).
"
7W-H Div. Release No. R-837 (June 10, 1940).
-
8W-H Div. Interp. Bull. No. 13, §15 (1940).




5. Overtime "Voluntarily" Worked.
If an "eager beaver" takes his ledgers home, or returns to the plant
after hours to correct errors, does the Fair Labor Standards Act impose
any liability on the employer? Quite possibly. The Act requires payment
in accordance with the specified standards for "employment," and de-
fines "employ" to include "to suffer or permit to work." 1 If the em-
ployer has actual or constructive knowledge that after-hours work is
being done (at least when it is an integral part of "principal" activities
so as not to be affected by the Portal-to-Portal Act), he may be respon-
sible for compliance with the statutory standards of compensation with
reference to the time involved.8 2 Merely instructing the employee to
desist might not protect the employer, so long as the after-hours work
continues and the employer fails to discipline the employee for dis-
obedience.
On the other hand, the courts have regarded with disfavor claims
for back-pay based upon time which the employee worked but concealed
from the employer. Estoppel is not a very reliable defense for the em-
ployer in this connection, but it has been recognized; and the employee's
failure to report the time, and his acceptance of pay for shorter hours.
may cast doubt on his credibility.38
6. Travel Time.
Time spent commuting to and from the place of employment is sub-
ject to the Portal-to-Portal Act. But other travel time may be hours
worked despite contract, custom or practice to the contrary. For ex-
ample, travel from one job to another during the regular workday must
normally be deemed working time. The same is true of travel after
hours at the direction and on the business of the employer. Such travel
may be said to be indispensable to, and an integral part of, the "princi-
pal" activities for which the worker is hired.34
When an employee who normally has a regular workday is sent on
an extended business trip, the Division's enforcement policy has been
that the travel time outside usual working hours need not be counted-
but in this connection travel time on holidays and weekends, and other
days not usually worked, is to be counted to the same extent as though
it had occurred on a regular workday. As to occupations requiring rela-
tively continuous travel, the Division has been disposed to recognize
11 Act §§3(g), 7(a).
2 Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas, 195 Okla. 437, 158 P. 2d 713 (1945). But
ef. Bowman v. Pace Co., 119 F. 2d 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
" Mortenson v. Western Light & Telephone Co., 42 F. Supp. 319 (S. D. Iowa,
1941); Cotton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 20 Wash. 2d 300, 147 P. 2d 299
(1944)9; Gale v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 158 Kan. 30, 145 P. 2d 125 (1944).
"29 CODE FED. REGS. §790.7 (1947). But cf. Dollar v. Caddo River Lbr. Co..
'1 R" Supp. 822 (D. Ark. 1941).
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any "reasonable" employer-employee agreement or practice as to the
proportion of travel time to be considered hours worked, so long as it
takes equitable account of the proportion of the time subjected to call
or spent in active work.3 5
D. Conclusion
From what has been said, it will be apparent that the courts, as well
as the Administrator, have shown a fairly consistent inclination to
construe the concept of working time rather liberally in favor of the
employee. This may or may not be palatable, depending upon your
point of view. In any event, it is a factor which merits consideration
in determining a wage policy or advising a client as to potential lia-
bilities under the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 6
"W-H Div. Interp. Bull. No. 13, §§12-14 (1940). Caveat: the reliability of
such pre-Portal-Act enforcement policies is limited. See 29 CODE FED. REos. Part
775, 12 F. R. 3915 (1947), rescinding as of June 30, 1947, all administrative in-
structions and statements inconsistent with the policy that employers should be
held responsible for strict compliance vith the Act.
6 The following general references may be of interest in connection with some
of the problems discussed in this article: Christensen, "De Minimis" it; Portal Pay
Suits, 26 MIcH. S. B. J. 5 (1947) ; Cotter, Portal to Portal Pay, 32 VA. L. Rv.
44 (1947) ; D'Amico, "Working Time" and the Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 9
FFD. B. J. 375 (1948) ; Note, Constitutional Law--Retrospective Laws-Portal to
Portal Act, 33 MINN. L. Rav. 68 (1948) ; Note, Fair Labor Standards under the
Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. OF ClII. L. REv. 352 (1948).
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